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A mental metaphor is a strategy that consists of completing the representation of
a concept with structural components of a correlating concept. Three issues were
addressed here to deepen our understanding of this mechanism: the use of mental
metaphors between abstract concepts, the simultaneous activation of multiple mental
metaphors and the importance of the focus of attention on the relevant dimensions of a
mental metaphor. In two experiments, participants made temporal or valence judgments
(with their left or right hand) on verbs with a negative or positive meaning and conjugated
in the past or future form, allowing for the simultaneous activation of the “time is space”,
“valence is space,” and “time is valence” mental metaphors. Left-past/right-future and
left-negative/right-positive congruency effects were found, and these effects were greater
in the temporal and valence judgment tasks, respectively, demonstrating the importance
of attentional cuing. Simultaneously, a congruency effect between the abstract concepts
of time and valence (past-negative/future-positive) was observed, revealing that a mental
metaphor can occur between abstract concepts and that multiple metaphors can be
processed simultaneously. These results are discussed in terms of different theories
within the field of mental metaphors.
Keywords: mental metaphor, conceptual metaphor, coherent working models, time, valence, space
INTRODUCTION
Research on conceptualization has demonstrated that participants frequently resort to a
metaphorical strategy when processing a concept. This strategy consists of borrowing structural
components of a correlating concept to complete the structure of the concept at hand. A good
example of this phenomenon is the well-studied mental metaphor1 of time onto the sagittal axis
1In this study, we use the terminology “mental metaphor” as termed by Casasanto (2013) to refer to what Lakoff and Johnson
(1980) firstly called “Conceptual Metaphor.” The reasons for this change is that the terminology “conceptual metaphor” refers
to mental metaphors being stored within the structure of the borrowing concept, in long term memory, and to a metaphoric
process used exclusively to help the processing of abstract concepts, two assumptions that we are rejecting in the current
article.
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of space (past-behind/future-front). This mental metaphor
would be a mental transmutation of the experience of time
flowing while walking through a path, leaving the past behind and
moving forward toward the future (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
The result, according to Santiago et al. (2011), is a more efficient
conceptual representation for the task that is to be carried out
with the concept.
Even though the mechanisms involved in this metaphoric
process have received much attention during the past decades,
many issues are still unresolved or are a matter of debate. This
study aims to address three important issues in the field of
mental metaphors in order to respond to the following questions:
(1) “Can the processing of an abstract concept modulate the
processing of another abstract concept?”; (2) “Can multiple
mental metaphors be processed at the same time and, if this
is the case, what are the underlying mechanisms allowing for
this simultaneous activation?”; (3) “Is the focus of attention
important for activating a mental metaphor?” Each issue is
discussed in detail below.
Can the Processing of an Abstract
Concept Modulate the Processing of
Another Abstract Concept?
Based on linguistic evidence, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) were the
first to systematically study mental metaphors, adopting the view
that they termedConceptualMetaphor Theory. Their inventory of
linguistic expressions reflecting this structural borrowing process
was mainly composed of abstract concepts benefiting from the
structures of concrete concepts. For example, in the expressions
“I am looking forward to their response” or “I am feeling up
today,” the concept of space is used to understand the concepts
of time and valence, respectively. On the opposite side, there
are no or very few expressions of space being understood by
the concepts of time or valence (e.g., you cannot say “I was
looking at the plane positive in the sky” or “John sat in the
future ofme”). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) concluded that abstract
concepts must have a structure that is not as complete as that of
concrete concepts due to a lack of grounding in sensory-motor
experiences. In order to complete the content of an abstract
concept, elements from a more complete conceptual structure
(the structure of a concrete concept) would be borrowed.
The results of previous studies investigating the psychological
reality of Conceptual Metaphor Theory supported this central
assumption. One of the most famous demonstrations was that
by Boroditsky (2000), who studied an effect resulting from the
mental metaphor of time onto the sagittal spatial axis. Boroditsky
(2000) observed that the processing of the concrete domain of
space could modulate the processing of the abstract domain
of time, but not the other way around. According to her, the
frequent use of a mental metaphor would lead to its storage in
long-term memory, within the structure of the abstract concept.
As a result, the activation of the abstract concept, but not the
concrete concept, would also activate the mental metaphor.
However, alternative explanations have been proposed. Walsh
(2003) put forward the ATOM theory (A Theory Of Magnitude).
According to this theory, all concepts of magnitude (concepts
that can be quantified as more or less, such as quantity,
space, time or even valence) share neural substrates to process
the dimension of magnitude. The simultaneous processing of
concepts of magnitude would automatically lead to congruency
effects because the different dimensions of magnitude would be
processed as a consequence of a shared neural mechanism. A
further proposal, the Coherent Working Models (Santiago et al.,
2011; for a similar view, see also Marmolejo-Ramos et al., in
press), suggests that the mental metaphors are “built” in working
memory while the task is carried out. According to the Coherent
Working Models, a mental model of the task would be built in
working memory to meet task goals. This mental model would
include the concepts that are correlating within a task (such
as time and space when walking through a path) and form a
common representation that is coherent with task goals (past-
behind/future-front, for the previous example). After repeated
use, a mental metaphor could be stored in long-term memory
for further use, but not within the structure of the borrowing
concept. This mental metaphor would need to be reactivated in
working memory in order to again be part of a mental model.
These two alternative explanations have in common the notion
that the degree of abstractness (or concreteness) of a concept is no
more an issue and they predict bi-directional influences between
the concrete and the abstract domains.
Accordingly, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006), Zhong and
Leonardelli (2008) and Ouellet et al. (2010a) have demonstrated
that processing information from the abstract domain can
modulate the processing of the information of the concrete
domain. First, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) studied the link
between the purity of the body and morality. Participants
were asked to recall an unethical or an ethical deed. They
demonstrated that the participants who recalled an unethical
deed were more prone to take antiseptic wipes than the
participants who recalled an ethical deed. Second, Zhong and
Leonardelli (2008) studied the link between the domain of
temperature and that of social relationships. People can speak
of a “cold atmosphere” or a “warm person” when speaking
about social relationships. In their study, Zhong and Leonardelli
(2008) demonstrated the psychological reality of this metaphor
by asking their participants to recall a social exclusion or a social
inclusion experience. This mere recall was enough to modulate
the perception of the temperature in the room. Participants who
recalled a social exclusion experience estimated the temperature
of the room to be lower than those who recalled a social inclusion
experience. Third, Ouellet et al. (2010a) used temporal stimuli to
orient participants’ spatial attention. They observed a congruency
effect according to the left-past/right-future mental metaphor.
Moreover, Santiago et al. (2012) were able to observe a
bi-directional conceptual congruency effect for the negative-
down/positive-up mental metaphor. In their study, participants
were asked to make valence (Experiments 2 and 3) or spatial
(Experiments 4 and 7) judgments on positive or negative
emotional words presented above or below a face silhouette.
When the instructions were simply to make valence (Experiment
2) or spatial (Experiment 4) judgments, they did not observe any
congruency effect between the dimensions of valence and space.
However, when the participants were endogenously cued to the
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irrelevant dimension of the task (by asking them to report in
which position more words appeared in the valence judgment
task or whether there were more positive or negative words in
the spatial judgment task), they observed a congruency effect
between the dimensions of valence and space in both tasks.
Effectively, apart from observing that the concrete spatial domain
of space could modulate the processing of valence (Experiment
3), they also observed that the abstract domain of valence could
modulate the processing of space (Experiment 7). Thus, the key
factor was the attentional focus given to the irrelevant conceptual
dimension of the task, rather than the degree of abstractness (or
concreteness) of the prime vs. the target.
Another study by Rusconi et al. (2006) also demonstrated
that a mental metaphor is possible between two concepts with a
low level of abstractness. Effectively, they observed a congruency
effect between space and pitch. In their study, when participants
were asked to make discrimination judgments on high- and low-
pitched sounds with an upper or a lower response key, they
were better at making “up” and “down” responses for high-
frequency and low-frequencies pitches sounds, respectively, than
the opposite.
The last piece missing in order to discard the claim that
a mental metaphor necessarily involves an abstract concept
benefiting from the more complete structure of a concrete
concept is to demonstrate that a mental metaphor can occur
between two concepts with a high level of abstractness. To the
best of our knowledge, this type of mental metaphor has not
yet been demonstrated. From our point of view, the studies that
have come closest to achieving this are those showing that the
perception of short temporal durations can be modulated by the
processing of an abstract concept such as numbers (participants
perceive the duration of a stimulus to be shorter when processing
low numbers and longer when processing high numbers; see
Dormal et al., 2006; Roitman et al., 2007; Vicario et al., 2008).
However, a short duration perceived in an online task may not
qualify as a concept with a high level of abstractness, due to
the fact that the perception of short durations can be directly
perceived thanks to the ticking of the participants’ internal clock,
as discussed by most of the authors of these studies.
In the present study, two concepts with a high level of
abstractness were used—time and valence. In order to ensure the
abstract nature of the concept of time, verbs conjugated in either
the past or future tense were used to refer to these two poles
of the time concept (for other studies using a similar strategy,
see Torralbo et al., 2006; Ouellet et al., 2010a,b). The second
abstract dimension was that of valence (positive or negative).
Both dimensions were simultaneously activated due to the use
of French positive or negative verbs conjugated in past or
future forms (e.g., “haïssaient”—“they hated” or “applaudira”—
“he will applaud”). Any interaction between valence and time
concepts under these circumstances could only be explained by
an interaction between concepts with a high level of abstraction.
Studies on the temporal value asymmetry (TVA) point to the
existence of interactions between past-future time and positive-
negative valence (e.g., Caruso et al., 2008; Guo et al., 2012). In
these studies participants are asked to economically value past or
future events. For example, they can be asked how much they
would pay for a bottle of wine in order to thank a friend for letting
them use his vacation home. . . 1 week ago or in 1 week from now.
Caruso et al. (2008) demonstrated that people assigned a different
monetary value to similar events depending on whether they
were past or future events. Guo et al. (2012) also demonstrated
that this effect was linked to cultural factors; whilst European
Canadians gave more value to events in the future than to events
in the past, Chinese Canadians showed the opposite pattern. Guo
et al. (2012) attributed this cultural effect to the different ways
of representing time. In Chinese culture, time is perceived as
something cyclic, where the past is central because the future is a
simple repetition of what has already happened (Biao, 2001; Guo
et al., 2012). In contrast, North Americans have a more linear
representation of time in which the future is more important
because it is subject to a certain level of control, whereas the
past is seen as something that cannot be changed (Graham, 1981;
Spears et al., 2001). However, studies on the TVA effect cannot
be considered as definitive proof of a congruency effect between
two abstract concepts. Effectively, the valuation is made via the
use of a concrete concept (money) and the reference to the past
or the future is made via reference to episodic events, which are
much more concrete than the reference to the past or the future
in general. As a consequence, the TVA congruency effect could
be explained by an association between the concrete concepts of
money and episodic events, rather than an association between
the abstract concepts of time and valence.
Even if the findings of Guo et al.’s (2012) study do not
constitute direct evidence for the positive and negative valuations
of the past and future in a more general and abstract way,
it can help to predict the congruency effect that should be
obtained with French participants, who also seem to represent
time in a linear fashion (Yamada and Kato, 2001). Following this
logic, French participants should show a past-negative/future-
positive congruency effect. It is also important to note that
the task used by Guo et al. (2012) caused the participants to
implement a reflective process. Consequently, it is possible that
the mechanisms used to value temporal concepts under these
task conditions might differ from those (possibly more automatic
processes) measured in the mental metaphor literature. For this
reason, the task used here was developed to measure more
automatic aspects of the time-valence mental metaphor.
Can Multiple Mental Metaphors Be
Processed at the Same Time and, If This Is
the Case, What Are the Underlying
Mechanisms Allowing for This
Simultaneous Activation?
Vicario et al. (2008) studied the simultaneous activation of
two mental metaphors: the “short durations—low numbers/long
durations—high numbers” and the “short durations—left/long
durations—right” mental metaphors. Their findings suggest that
at least two mental metaphors can be used at the same time;
while participants were making underestimations on the left
side and overestimations on the right side they were also
making underestimations and overestimations with low and high
numbers, respectively. Unfortunately, the analyses conducted
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by Vicario et al. (2008) did not allow for an assessment of
whether these simultaneous activations were independent or
whether they interacted together to form a kind of conglomerate
representation. Instead of using statistical methods that would
have included all the factors (Durations, Space, and Numbers)
in a unique design, which allows for confirming the absence or
presence of a three-way interaction, they carried out separated
analyses for the congruency effects between Durations and
Numbers, and between Durations and Space.
It is of importance to examine whether the simultaneous
activations of multiple mental metaphors are independent or
dependent of each other, since this can provide insights into
the nature of the mechanisms that allow for their corresponding
congruency effects. As explained above, Boroditsky (2000)
considered the possibility that the mental metaphors are stored
in long-term memory within the representation of the concepts
that benefit from the structural borrowing process. According
to her, processing such a concept would automatically activate
its associated mental metaphor. In addition, when a mental
metaphor is activated, it could not be manipulated. In this case,
varying the degree of activation of the conceptual components
of a mental metaphor would not have any effect on the
processing of that mental metaphor. Thus, processing onemental
metaphor that has a particular conceptual component could
not modulate the simultaneous processing of another mental
metaphor that also has this same conceptual component. For
example, if a participant reads the verb “they will succeed”, she/he
would activate the “left-negative/right-positive” and the “left-
past/right-future” mental metaphors. Both metaphors—activated
by this stimulus—would prime the space on the right, but the
congruency effect observed for one mental metaphor would not
interact with the congruency effect of the other mental metaphor.
In other words, the congruency effects would be additive.
Another approach (Santiago et al., 2011; see also Marmolejo-
Ramos et al., in press) suggests that the conceptual maps are
“built” in working memory while the task is carried out and/or
depend on the simultaneous use of the same neural substrates
(Walsh, 2003). In both cases (Walsh, 2003; Santiago et al., 2011),
the structural components participating in the distinct mental
metaphors would be activated and simultaneously used to form
these metaphors. Thus, two or more mental metaphors sharing
a conceptual domain would also share common resources and
compete for the simultaneous use of these resources. As a result,
each mental metaphor would modulate the processing of the
other, and the congruency effects should therefore interact.
Time and Valence concepts are particularly interesting
because they share a common spatial projection on the left-
right horizontal axis. On the one hand, the past-left/future-right
mental metaphor of time would originate from the correlation
between the directional activity of reading/writing and the
passage of time during this activity (Ouellet et al., 2010b). On
the other hand, Casasanto and Chrysikou (2011), and de la
Vega et al. (2013; see also de la Vega et al., 2012, Experiments
2 and 3) demonstrated that the negative-left/positive-right
mental metaphor of valence depends on the greater fluency
experienced on the dominant side of the body. Consequently,
asking participants to make temporal (past or future) or valence
(negative or positive) judgments with their left or right hand
on negative or positive verbs conjugated to the past or the
future would allow the simultaneous activation of three mental
metaphors at the same time. Independently of the interacting
or independent activation of the mental metaphors, French
right-handed participants should show negative-left/positive-
right (Valence-Space), past-left/future-right (Time-Space) and
past-negative/future-positive (Time-Valence) congruency effects.
Is the Focus of Attention Important for
Activating a Mental Metaphor?
Santiago et al. (2011), based on an extensive review of the
literature, concluded that the relevant concepts of a mental
metaphor needed to be activated to a certain degree for a
congruency effect to happen. It thus follows that attentional
factors should play a key role in this conceptual activation.
Santiago et al. (2012) were the first to systematically investigate
how the focus of attention on the relevant concepts of a mental
metaphor could modulate its activation. As explained above,
the type of judgment (on valence or vertical space) oriented
participants’ attention toward the concept that had to be judged
and, in order to observe a positive-up/negative-down congruency
effect, attention also had to be cued to the irrelevant concept
of the task. Another finding is that of Torralbo et al. (2006)
who studied a concept (time) that can be mapped onto various
conceptual dimensions (sagittal or coronal spatial axis). In
their study, participants were asked to judge either verbally
or manually (with their left and right hands) the temporal
reference of words appearing to the left or right on the screen.
The left-past/right-future congruency effect emerged only in
the task with manual judgments. The use of the left and right
hands cued participants’ attention to these spatial locations and
allowed the mapping of time onto the left-right horizontal axis.
In the same vein, de la Vega et al. (2012) demonstrated that
asking right-handed participants to perform a simple lexical
judgment task (Experiment 1) on positive and negative words
with their left and right hands was not enough to observe a left-
negative/right-positive congruency effect. The activation of this
mental metaphor was observed only when the attention of the
participant was cued on the valence dimension of the stimuli by
asking them to make positive or negative judgments on these
stimuli (Experiment 2). In their last experiment (Experiment 4),
they also demonstrated that attention needed to be cued on the
spatial dimension as well by showing that the congruency effect
emerged only when the mapping of the spatial response was
explicit, not implicit.
Based on these findings, in the present study participants
should show greater congruency effects for the mental metaphors
that have their conceptual components cued by the task.
Because participants had to make temporal and valence
judgments (with their left and right hands) in separate
blocks, it was expected that the past-left/future-right and
negative-left/positive-right congruency effects would be greater
in the temporal and valence judgment tasks, respectively.
Because the relative salience of the irrelevant conceptual
dimension for the past-negative/future-positive congruency
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1019
Spatola et al. The Sad Past Is Left
effects was similar in both tasks, it was anticipated that
this congruency effect would be of a similar size in both
tasks.
These predictions run counter to Boroditsky’s (2000) and
Walsh’s (2003) theories. As explained earlier, Boroditsky
(2000) assumed that, with time, a mental metaphor
becomes a structural component of the borrowing concept.
Consequently, the borrowing concept cannot be processed
without the activation of its associated mental metaphors.
Thus, the degree of attention allocated to the lending concept
could not modulate the degree of activation of a mental
metaphor. Regarding Walsh’s (2003) theory, the activation
of the magnitude domain would also be automatic when
processing a concept that can be quantified. Thus, attention
could not modulate the congruency effects between these
concepts.
HYPOTHESES
First, based on the findings that mental metaphors can exist
between concepts at similar levels of abstractness (Rusconi
et al., 2006) and the fact that people from western cultures
tend to value more positively future than past events (Caruso
et al., 2008; Guo et al., 2012), we expected that the mental
metaphor between the abstract dimensions of time and valence
would occur so that a past-negative/future-positive congruency
effect should emerge. In particular, negative verbs conjugated
to past and positive verbs conjugated to the future should be
responded to more rapidly and more accurately than negative
verbs conjugated to future and positive verbs conjugated to the
past, respectively.
Second, we predicted that the mental metaphors between
time and valence, time and the coronal axis, and valence and
the coronal axis should be activated simultaneously. Looking
at whether these simultaneous activations occur independently
one of each other or whether they interact will deepen our
understanding of the mechanism that allows these simultaneous
activations. Independent activations would suggest that mental
metaphors are stored in long-term memory, within the structure
of the concept that benefits from the lending process (Boroditsky,
2000). These representations would be fixed and could not
be manipulated. Interactions between these activations would
suggest that mental metaphors are elaborated during the
accomplishment of the task. Interactions would occur because
the same resources would be used by multiple metaphors at
the same time. While the Coherent Working Models (Santiago
et al., 2011; see also Marmolejo-Ramos et al., in press) would
explain such a phenomenon in terms of the simultaneous use of
conceptual information in working memory, the ATOM theory
(Walsh, 2003) would suppose that this is due to the shared use of
neural substrates to process the domain of magnitude.
Third, based on previous results, we also predicted that the
focus of attention should play a role in the activation of the
mental metaphors. Because the temporal dimension will be
cued in the temporal judgment task (with the left and right
hands), the past-left/future-right congruency effect should be
greater in the temporal compared to the valence judgment task
whilst the converse should be true for the negative-left/positive-
right congruency effect. With respect to the past-negative/future-
positive congruency effect, we expected this to be of a similar
size in both judgment tasks because the salience of the irrelevant
dimension in each task was similar. If attention does not
modulate the activation of the mental metaphors used here,
it would imply that their activation is more automatic than
originally hypothesized by Santiago et al. (2011).
EXPERIMENTS 1
Participants
The participants were 32 (28 women; mean age = 18.88 years,
SD = 1.17) undergraduate students. They were all from the
University Blaise Pascal of Clermont-Ferrand (France) and took
part in this experiment in exchange for course credit. All
participants were French native speakers and reported having
normal or corrected to normal vision. They all gave informed
written consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Design
A 2 (Type of judgment: Time vs. Valence) × 2 (Time: Past vs.
Future) × 2 (Valence: Negative vs. Positive) × 2 (Response side:
Left vs. Right) within-subject design was used.
Material
The stimuli were 20 positive and 20 negative verbs (see Appendix
I for a list of the materials). The positive or negative value of each
verb was first determined on the intuition of the experimenters
and a post-test with 12 French native speakers unaware of the
goals of the present study served to test whether or not these
sets of verbs differed significantly in their ratings. The judgment
task was programmed in E-Prime and each verb appeared once
in a random order at the infinitive form. A Likert scale was used
(1: Extremely negative; 2: Very negative; 3: Negative; 4: Neutral;
5: Positive; 6: Very positive; 7: Extremely positive) and, for each
verb, the judge had to press one of the keys from 1 to 7. The mean
values for the positive and negative verbs were 5.85 (SE = 0.28)
and 2.38 (SE = 0.25), respectively (the mean scores for each verb
are presented in Appendix I). This difference was significant in
the analyses by participants [t1(11) =−30.008, p < 0.001] and by
items [t2(38) =−34.453, p < 0.001].
Two lists of 80 stimuli were created. In a first list, half of the
verbs were presented inflected to the 3rd singular person of the
past and to the 3rd plural person of the future, and the other
half was presented to the 3rd plural person of the past and to the
3rd singular person of the future (see Table 1 for examples of the
stimuli). The same verbs were presented in a second list, but with
the opposite conjugation arrangement. Special care was taken
to ensure the consistency of syllable structure, word length, and
frequency of the verb lemma across all conditions (see Table 2).
All characters were written in lower case, bold Courier font,
point size 18 and presented on a computer screen on a light gray
background.
The task was programmed in E-prime and ran on an Intel
Core 2 Duo 1.8 GHz computer. The stimuli were presented on a
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TABLE 1 | Examples of the stimuli as a function of their valence, temporal reference, and number.
Temporal reference Number Valence
Negative Positive
Past Singular “Trahissait—“she/he betrayed” “Réussissait”—“she/he succeeded”
Plural “Trahissaient”—“they betrayed” “Réussissaient”—“they succeeded”
Future Singular “Trahira”—“she/he will betray” “Réussira”—“she/he will succeed”
Plural “Trahiront”—“they will betray” “Réussiront”—“they will succeed”
TABLE 2 | Means of the principal characteristics of the stimuli (Number of letters,
Number of syllables, Frequencies of occurrence in texts and movies data bases)
and Standard Errors (in brackets) as a function of the Valence, Temporal reference,
and Number of the verbs.
Temporal
reference
Number No. of letters
and syllables
Valence
Negative Positive
Past Singular No. of letters 9.7(0.4) 10(0.4)
No. of syllables 3.1(0.1) 3.1(0.2)
Plural No. of letters 11.7(0.4) 12(0.4)
No. of syllables 3.1(0.1) 3.1(0.2)
Future Singular No. of letters 7.6(0.3) 7.8(0.3)
No. of syllables 3.1(0.1) 3.2(0.2)
Plural No. of letters 9.6(0.3) 9.8(0.3)
No. of syllables 3.1(0.1) 3.2(0.2)
Frequencies of occurrences Texts 69.1(27.3) 86.7(31)
Movies 46.7(18.3) 64.1(15.1)
The frequencies of occurrences of the verb lemma are expressed in occurrences per
million and are from a texts database and a movies database (New et al., 2004). Results
are rounded to the nearest tenth.
20-inch LG Flatron screen (6ms refreshing rate), and an E-prime
SRBOX was used to collect participants’ responses.
The French version of the hospital anxiety and depression
scale (HAD) was used to assess the participants’ anxiety and
depression levels (Razavi et al., 1989)2.
Procedure and Design
Participants sat in a quiet room at approximately 60 cm from the
screen. They were first informed that they would have to make
either temporal (past or future) or valence (negative or positive)
judgments on verbs in different blocks. They were also instructed
that they would have to perform these judgments as fast and
accurately as possible with their left and right indexes on the left-
most and right-most buttons (7.8 cm form center to center) of the
SRBOX, respectively.
The first list of verbs was assigned to half of the participants
and the second list to the other half. The experiment was divided
into twomain blocks, each one dedicated to one type of judgment
2The results corresponding to HAD questionnaire will be analyzed in a further
study that will include the results of a greater number of participants in order
test whether or not the participants present conceptual biases associated with their
mood.
(temporal or valence). Each main block was further divided
into two sub-blocks. Within each sub-block, the complete list
of verbs was presented. These sub-blocks differed in terms of
the mapping of left and right responses for “past” or “future”
judgment in the temporal judgments task, and in terms of the
mapping of left and right responses for “negative” or “positive”
judgments in the valence judgments task. In other words, each
participant had to carry out both valence and temporal tasks once
with a congruent and once with an incongruent response-key
assignment, in counterbalanced order.
The order of presentation of the two types of judgment
was counterbalanced across participants, as was the order of
presentation of the blocks differing in response mapping, leading
to a total of eight different levels of counterbalancing. The
complete sequence of the experiment was repeated twice.
The trial structure was as follows (see Figure 1). First, a
fixation cross (a plus sign) was presented at the center of the
screen for 500ms. The target then appeared for 4,000ms or
until a response was made. Finally, there was a blank screen for
1,500ms before the next trial. If the participant made an error or
did not respond to the target, a BEEP was sounded following the
removal of the target.
When the experiment was finished, the French version of
the HAD questionnaire was presented to the participant. The
participant was instructed to fill it in as honestly as possible and
to place it in a box when finished, to ensure anonymity.
Results
The data set is deposited in a public repository (Spatola et al.,
2017). The data from two participants were discarded because
they responded randomly in at least one block (around 50% of
accurate responses). Responses to two verbs (“vaincre,” meaning
“to win,” and “évanouir,” meaning “to faint”) in all conjugated
forms were also removed from the analyses because errors were
made on more than 25% of the trials in the valence judgment
task. The results obtained from the remaining participants and
items are summarized in Appendix II. Errors occurred on
3.41% (601 trials) of the trials and these trials were excluded
from the reaction times analyses. Correct trials with a reaction
time lower or higher than 2.5 SD (standard deviations) per
condition for each participant were considered outliers (this
filtering procedure has the advantage of taking out extreme values
without affecting the data of one condition or of one participant
in particular) and also excluded from the reaction time analyses,
which corresponded to 583 trials (3.42% of the trials). In order
to ensure that the observed effects were not due to the type
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FIGURE 1 | Trial structure in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. “trahira” means “she/he will betray”.
of filter used, a multiverse analysis was carried out (Steegen
et al., 2016). The reaction time filters compared to the one we
chose were: 2 median absolute deviations (MAD) and 2 SD
per condition for each participant, and no reaction time filter
(see Marmolejo-Ramos et al., 2015, for a discussion of the most
appropriate reaction time filters according to the characteristics
of the data; see also Marmolejo-Ramos et al., 2015). We did
not use a logarithmic transformation, because it is problematic
when one condition is significantly slower than the other (Lo and
Andrews, 2015); judgments of valence were much slower than
temporal judgements in the present study. We did not observe
any significant interaction between the use of the different filters
and the effects of core interest for the present study. The pattern
was always similar, but excess data were removed with±2 SD and
±2 MAD (>5%) and the results were somewhat noisier without
any filter.
To assess the effects of Type of judgment (Temporal vs.
Valence), Time (Past vs. Future), Valence (negative vs. positive)
and Response side (left vs. right) on latency and accuracy data,
separate linear mixed models (LMM) were used, one for each
dependent variable Brysbaert, 2007; Baayen et al., 2008; Bates
et al., 2015). Analyses were run with the lmerTest package for
R (Kuznetsova et al., 2016; R Core Team, 2017). Backward
elimination of non-significant effects of the linear mixed effect
model was performed with the step function. The p-values
for the fixed effects were calculated based on Sattethwaite’s
approximation. The model included Type of judgment, Time,
Valence and Response side as Fixed effects factors, Subjects and
Items as Random effects factors, and the by-subject random
slopes for valence (using R syntax, the model tested for the
reaction times results was: RT ∼ Type_of_judgment ∗ Time ∗
Valence ∗ Response_side + (1+Valence|Subjects) + (1|Items)).
The rationale behind the choice of this model and the use of
backward elimination can be summarized as follows. In their
study, Barr et al. (2013) have shown that the best models were
those that use maximal random effect structures justified by the
design, followed by the models that use a backward elimination
procedure (starting with the maximal structure). Both methods
of data analysis have proved to be efficient at avoiding Type I
error. However, Bates et al.’s (2015) have demonstrated that Barr
et al. (2013) findings were difficult to apply to real data. They
demonstrated that maximal random effect structures tend to not
converge and that using too many parameters can lead to models
that are difficult to interpret. Thus, in order to have a model
that is adequate for our experimental design and to avoid Type
I error as much as possible, we determined the maximal random
effects structure justified by the design before using the backward
elimination procedure.
Only the significant or marginally significant findings (with an
alpha level < 0.1) corresponding to these models are reported in
the text. The results of core interest are summarized in Table 2.
Accuracy Analyses
Accuracy analyses revealed a significant interaction between
Valence and Response side factors [b = 2.54, t(9,014) = 3.132,
p < 0.01]. What is more, this interaction was modulated by
the Type of judgment factor [b = −3.42, t(9,014) = −2.978,
p < 0.01; see Figure 2]. The three-way interaction between
Type of judgment, Time and Response side was also significant
[b = 2.46, t(9,014) = 2.138, p < 0.05; see Figure 3]. The nature of
these three-way interactions was further examined by conducting
separate multilevel models on each level of the Type of judgment
factor, including both the two-way interactions of Valence by
Response side, and Time by Response side. While the interaction
between Valence and Response side was significant in valence
judgment task [b= 2.55, t(4,460) = 2.966, p< 0.01], but not in the
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of correct trials per condition in Experiment 1, as a function of Type of judgment, Valence, and Response side. **p < 0.01.
temporal judgment task [b = −0.88, t(4,460) = −1.178, p > 0.1],
it was the opposite for the Time by Response side interaction,
which was significant in the temporal judgment task [b = 1.93,
t(4,460) = 2.592, p < 0.01], but not in the valence judgment task
[b= −0.53, t(4,460) =−0.614, p > 0.1].
Of lesser interest to the purpose of this study, the interaction
between Type of judgment and Valence factors was significant
[b = 3.16, t(9,014) = 3.888, p < 0.001], showing that, contrary
to the temporal judgment task, participants were making more
errors on negative compared to positive verbs in the valence
judgment task. The significant interaction between Type of
judgment and Time factors [b = −1.67, t(9,014) = −2.052,
p < 0.05] revealed that the greater precision of the participants
for past compared to future words was stronger in the valence
judgment task than in the temporal judgment task. The main
effect of Valence [b= −2.15, t(102) = −2.664, p < 0.01] was also
significant: participants were more precise when judging positive
compared to negative words.
Reaction Time Analyses
In the reaction time analysis, the three-way interaction between
Type of judgment, Time andValence was significant [b=−39.36,
t(8,980) = −2.191, p < 0.05; see Figure 4]. A separate multilevel
model was conducted on each level of the Type of judgment
factor that included the two-way interactions of Time by Valence.
These separate multilevel analyses revealed that the negative-
past/positive-future congruency effect was significant in the
temporal judgment task [b=−26.27, t(4,465) = −2.330, p< 0.05]
but not in the valence judgment task [b = 13.6, t(4,433) = 1.061,
p > 0.1].
Of less interest was the significant Type of judgment by
Valence interaction [b = 54.88, t(8,980) = −4.321, p < 0.001],
showing that, while positive verbs elicited faster responses than
negative verbs in the temporal judgment task, the opposite
was the case in the valence judgment task. The interaction
between Type of judgment and Time was marginally significant
[b = 23.24, t(8,980) = 1.828, p = 0.067]: the tendency to respond
faster to the verbs conjugated to the future than to the past
tended to be greater in temporal judgment task compared with
the valence judgment task. The main effect of Type of judgment
was significant [b = −143.31, t(8,980) = −15.959, p < 0.001]:
participants were faster on the temporal judgment task compared
with the valence judgment task. Participants were also faster to
respond to negative compared with positive verbs [b = −33.75,
t(70) =−2.304, p < 0.05].
Discussion
In Experiment 1, a past-negative/future-positive congruency
effect was observed, meaning that a mental metaphor can occur
between two concepts with a high level of abstractness. This
finding goes against the previous belief that themental metaphors
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FIGURE 3 | Percentage of correct trials per condition in Experiment 1, as a function of Type of judgment, Time, and Response side. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
are necessarily used to map the less complete structures of
abstract concepts onto the more complete structures of concrete
concepts (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Boroditsky, 2000). As for
the activation of this mental metaphor in the temporal judgment
task only, a possibility is that it might be easier to activate this
mental metaphor when attention is focused on the dimension of
time compared with the dimension of valence. This phenomenon
would result from the daily use of this mental metaphor; people
speak of the past and the future in negative and positive terms,
but they do not speak of the valence dimension in temporal
terms. This repeated use of linguistic expressions would result
in the storage of the mental metaphor within the conceptual
structure of time (for a similar view, see Casasanto, 2008). Thus,
processing the dimension of time but not that of valence would
activate this mental metaphor. Another possible explanation is
related to the intrinsic saliency of the valence vs. the temporal
dimensions. In essence, some studies point out the greater
saliency of stimuli charged with emotional content compared
to other types of stimuli (e.g., Kuchinke et al., 2005; Nakic
et al., 2006). If this were the case here, only the concept of
valence would be processed in sufficient depth in a secondary
task to be able to modulate the processing of other concepts.
According to the Coherent Working Models theory (Santiago
et al., 2011), a key factor is the intrinsic level of saliency of
each dimension. A dimension with a high level of intrinsic
saliency processed in secondary task will be processed deeper
than a concept with a low level of intrinsic saliency and will
more likely be included in a mental model to form a mental
metaphor. Accordingly, Santiago et al. (2012) demonstrated
that the intrinsic features that contribute to the salience of
a conceptual dimension are able to modulate the orientation
of exogenous attention. In their study (Experiments 1 and
2), the conceptual dimension of space was processed in the
secondary task. The congruency effect between the conceptual
domains of valence (processed in the primary task) and space
was observed when the salience of the spatial dimension was high
(Experiment 1), but not when it was low (Experiment 2). The
salience of the spatial dimension was enhanced due to the use of
exogenous cues.
In the temporal judgment task, a left-past/right-future
congruency effect was also observed, meaning that two mental
metaphors can be processed at the same time (see Vicario et al.,
2008, for a similar result). Interestingly, since there was no
significant three-way interaction between the factors of Time,
Valence and Response side, it suggests that the activation of
these two congruency effects did not depend on the simultaneous
use of shared resources. Thus, processing two (or more)
mental metaphors that share conceptual compounds would not
contribute to form a conglomerate mental metaphor made up of
all these conceptual compounds.
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FIGURE 4 | Distribution of RT (in ms) data per condition in Experiment 1, as a function of Type of judgment, Time, and Valence. *p < 0.05.
In the valence judgment task only, a left-negative/right-
positive congruency effect was observed. This finding,
combined with the fact that the past-negative/future-
positive and left-past/right-future congruency effects were
observed in the temporal task only, demonstrate that the
activation of the mental metaphors is context specific and
confirm that the orientation of attention is important
to activate a mental metaphor (Santiago et al., 2011,
2012).
Despite being interesting, it is important to
note that most of the effects were observed in the
accuracy results only. It was thus essential to replicate
the present results, which was the main goal of
Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was almost identical to Experiment 1, with the
exception that it was repeated twice and in one of the two
sessions a mindfulness-based therapy induction was provided to
the participants3.
3This mindfulness induction was realized in order to test whether or not the biases
associated with the mood of the participant can be modulated, but this topic will
be analyzed in a further study that will include the results of a greater number of
participants in order to run correlation analyses.
Participants
The participants were 35 undergraduate students (26 women;
mean age = 20.63 years, SD = 2.88) from the same population
as in Experiment 1. None of them had participated in the first
experiment. They all gave informed written consent according to
the Declaration of Helsinki.
Material, Procedure, and Design
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 in all aspects, with the
following exceptions: each participant carried out the complete
experimental set described in Experiment 1 twice, once with
a mindfulness induction at the beginning of the experimental
session and another without any mindfulness induction. Half
the participants received the mindfulness induction in the first
session and the other half in the second session. One week
separated each session.
The mindfulness induction was an audio file4 presented to the
participant via headphones. The transcript and the translation of
the audio file are in Appendix III.
Results
The data set is deposited in a public repository (Spatola et al.,
2017). Three participants were replaced because it was later
4Rouget, B. W. (n.d.). Site Francophone sur la Pleine Conscience (Mindfulness)
en Psychothérapie. Available online at: http://sites.uclouvain.be/mindfulness/mp3/
BW4.mp3. (Accessed October 01, 2013).
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discovered that they were non-native French speakers. Responses
to the two same verbs as in Experiment 1 (“vaincre,” meaning
“win” and “évanouir,” meaning “fainting”) in all conjugated
forms were also removed. The accuracy and reaction time
results obtained from the remaining participants and items are
summarized in Appendix IV. Errors occurred on 4.79% of the
trials (1849 trials) and these trials were excluded from the
reaction times analyses. Following the same filtering procedure
as in Experiment 1, correct trials with a reaction time lower
or higher than 2.5 SD per condition for each participant were
considered outliers and also excluded from the reaction times
analyses, which corresponded to 1,138 trials (3.09% of the trials).
The resulting latency and accuracy data were subject to
similar analyses as in Experiment 1. The only differences were
that the Session and Mindfulness induction were included as
Random effect factors in the models, thereby taking into account
the variability that they might induce. Only the significant
or marginally significant findings (with an alpha level < 0.1)
corresponding to these models are reported in the text. The
results of core interest are summarized in Table 3.
Accuracy Analyses
Accuracy analyses revealed that the Time by Valence interaction
was significant [b = 8, t(19,378) = 12.585, p < 0.001] and this
interaction was modulated by the Type of judgment factor
[b = −6.23, t(19,378) = −6.932, p < 0.001; see Figure 5].
One separate multilevel model conducted per level of the
Type of judgment revealed that the negative-past/positive-
future congruency effect was significant in both the valence
[b = 8, t(9,657) = 11.352, p < 0.001] and the temporal
judgment tasks [b = 1.77, t(9,626) = 3.36, p < 0.001], though
the congruency effect was greater in the valence (4%) than
in temporal judgment tasks (1%). The Valence by Response
side interaction was significant [b = 1.1, t(19,378) = 2.448,
p < 0.05], showing a negative-left/positive-right association.
The significant Time by Response side interaction b = 2.01,
TABLE 3 | Summary of the results of Experiments 1 and 2 that are of core interest
for the main goals of this study.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Factors ACC RT ACC RT
Time × Valence n.s. n.s. *** ***
Time × Response side n.s. n.s. *** n.s.
Valence × Response side ** n.s. * ***
Type of judgment × Time × Valence n.s. * *** n.s.
Type of judgment × Time × Response side * n.s. n.s. ***
Type of judgment × Valence × Response side ** n.s. n.s. ***
Time × Valence × Response side n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Type of judgment × Time × Valence ×
Response side
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. ACC is for accuracy and RT is for reaction time
results.
t(19,378) = 4.461, p < 0.001] revealed a left-past/right-future
congruency effect.
Of lesser interest for the purpose of this study, the Type
of judgment by Time interaction was significant b = 3.74,
t(19,378) = 5.888, p < 0.001]: participants were more precise
on verbs conjugated to the past compared with the future
in the temporal task and it was the opposite in the valence
judgment task. The Type of judgment by Valence interaction
was significant [b = 2.22, t(19,378) = 3.494, p < 0.001],
showing that participants were more precise when responding
to negative compared with positive words in the valence
judgment task only. The main effects of Type of judgment
[b = 1.62, t(19,378) = 3.614, p < 0.001], Time [b = −5.24,
t(19,378) = −10.425, p < 0.001], Valence [b = −3.57,
t(107) = 3.614, p < 0.001] and Response side [b = −1.93,
t(19,378) = −4.953, p < 0.001] were significant: participants were
more precise when judging the verbs’ temporal reference, when
responding to verbs conjugated to the past, when these verbs were
negative or when they responded with their right hand compared
with the opposite.
Reaction Time Analyses
In the analysis of reaction times, the Time by Valence interaction
was significant [b = −24.81, t(18,937) = −4.484, p < 0.001],
showing a negative-past/positive-future congruency effect. The
Valence by Response side interaction was significant [b=−57.02,
t(18,938) = −7.256, p < 0.001]. Further, this interaction was
modulated by the Type of judgment factor [b = 73.43,
t(18,937) = 6.637, p < 0.001] (see Figure 6). Separate multilevel
models on each level of the Type of judgment factor showed
a significant negative-left/positive-right congruency effect in the
valence judgment task [b=−56.87, t(9,346) =−6.694, p < 0.001]
and, to our surprize, a smaller (8ms vs. 29ms) but opposite
congruency effect in the temporal task [b= 16.07, t(9,537) = 2.56,
p < 0.05). The interaction between Type of judgment, Time and
Response side was significant, [b = −42.54, t(18,937) = −3.845,
p < 0.001] (see Figure 7). Separate multilevel models on each
level of the Type of judgment factor revealed a left-past/right-
future association significant in the temporal judgment task
[b = −50.35, t(9,538) = −8.051, p < 0.001] but not in the
valence judgment task [b = −9, t(9,371) = −1.059, p >
0.1].
Of less interest was the significant interaction between Type of
judgment and Valence [b=−22.01, t(18,939) =−2.816, p< 0.01]:
in the valence judgement task, responses tended to be faster
for the negative than the positive verbs, whilst there was no
observable difference in the temporal judgment task. There was
a significant main effect of Type of judgment [b = −164.07,
t(18,937) = −24.296, p < 0.001]: participants were faster on the
temporal judgment task compared with the valence judgment
task. Participants also responded faster to future compared to
past verbs [b = 41.83, t(18,941) = 6.743, p < 0.001]. The main
effect of Valence was marginally significant [b= 24.04, t(66) 1.944,
p = 0.056], showing a tendency to respond faster to negative
than positive words. The main effect of Response side was also
significant [b= 41.83, t(18,941) = 6.743, p < 0.001], revealing that
the responses on the right were faster than on the left.
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FIGURE 5 | Percentage of correct trials per condition in Experiment 2, as a function of Type of judgment, Time, and Valence. ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 6 | Distribution of RT (in ms) data per condition in Experiment 2, as a function of Type of judgment, Valence, and Response side. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
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DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 allowed us to confirm several findings. First,
a mental metaphor can occur between two concepts with
a high level of abstractness. Second, multiple mental
metaphors can be processed at the same time. Third,
these simultaneously activated metaphors do not get
involved in higher order interactions, and, finally, the
orientation of attention is important to activate a mental
metaphor.
The observed congruency effects in Experiment 2 were,
in general, greater than those observed in Experiment 1
(see Appendix V for a combined analysis of Experiments
1 and 2). We hypothesized that the repetition of the same
experiment, which doubled the number of observations, might
have reduced experimental noise. Another possibility is linked
to the mindfulness induction, which is known to enhance
endogenous attention (Ryan and Deci, 2006; Jha et al., 2007;
Moore and Malinowski, 2009). If the participant had more
attentional resources to process each conceptual dimension
and attention plays a key role in the activation of the mental
metaphors (Santiago et al., 2011), then the congruency effects
should be stronger. However, a further analysis including
Mindfulness as a fixed factor did not allow us to observe
a pattern in support of this last possibility. Further research
will allow us to determine the factors that contribute to a
reduction of the experimental noise when processing mental
metaphors.
Contrary to Experiment 1, the interaction between the
concepts of Time and Valence was observed in both tasks and
even greater in the valence judgment task than in the temporal
judgment task. The possible reasons for such a discrepancy
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are taken up in the
General Discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main findings of the present study can be summarized as
follows: (1) a past-negative/future-positive congruency effect was
observed only in the temporal judgment task in Experiment
1 and in both tasks in Experiment 2; (2) a left-negative/right-
positive congruency effect was observed and this effect was
greater in the valence than in the temporal judgment task;
(3) a left-past/right-future congruency effect was observed
and this effect was greater in the temporal than in the
valence judgment task; (4) the three-way interaction between
the factors of Time, Valence, and Response side was not
significant.
Can Mental Metaphors Occur Between
Two Abstract Concepts?
In response to the question “Can mental metaphors occur
between two abstract concepts?” the present results indicate
that the response is positive. In line with previous results
obtained by Guo et al. (2012), a past-negative/future-positive
congruency effect was observed in the temporal judgment task
in Experiment 1 and in both the temporal and the valence
judgment task in Experiment 2. This congruency effect may
be linked to the linear representation of time of the French
participants (Yamada and Kato, 2001). According to Guo et al.
(2012), the cultures that adopt such a representation of time
value the future more positively than the past because it is
associated with progress and is something that is still under
control, whereas the past is, in some ways, of no value because
it cannot be changed. According to Guo et al. (2012), again,
this congruency effect should reverse in cultures that adopt
a cyclical representation of time because the past helps to
predict the future and the future is simply a repetition of the
past.
This result adds to previous findings, showing that mental
metaphors, apart from occurring between an abstract and a
concrete concept or between two concrete concepts (Rusconi
et al., 2006), can also exist between two abstract concepts.
This argues against the assumption made by Lakoff and
Johnson (1980), in which the structural borrowing process
should necessarily occur from the more complete conceptual
structures of the concrete domain toward the less complete
conceptual structures of the abstract domain. It is important
to note that this congruency effect cannot be attributed to a
side effect of the common spatial representations of valence
and time. If this were the case, a three-way interaction between
the factors of Time, Valence and Response side should have
emerged.
The Coherent Working Models (Santiago et al., 2011;
see also Marmolejo-Ramos et al., in press) appears to be a
better candidate to explain the mental metaphors between
abstract concepts. Effectively, this theory claims that, when
processing a concept, a mental model is built. This mental
model would include information from other concepts in order
to form a representation that is more complete for the task
at hand. The information included in the model should be
coherent with the task that has to be carried out with the
concept, and the final result would be a representation that
is more effective for that task. According to this view, the
degree to which a concept is abstract or concrete would be
irrelevant.
A further possible account of these types of mental metaphors
emerges from the ATOM theory (Walsh, 2003). Because time
and valence can be spoken of in terms of more or less (e.g.,
“I don’t have much time” or “I think that Jim is a better
person than Jack”), the magnitude domain of both concepts
would be processed by the use of the same neural substrates.
This shared use of the “magnitude processor” would result in
the congruency effects between both concepts. However, in the
task used here, participants were asked to make binary choices
(“past”/“future” or “negative”/”positive”), not to judge howmuch
a stimulus was positive or how far in time was the temporal
reference of another stimulus. In other words, the domain of
magnitude was irrelevant. Further, if that interaction depended
on the shared use of a “magnitude processor” and the two
other metaphors also depended on the same system, again,
a three-way interaction between the factors of Time, Valence,
and Response side should have emerged. As a consequence,
we consider the Coherent Working Models (Santiago et al.,
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2011; see also Marmolejo-Ramos et al., in press) to be the best
candidate to explain the metaphorical mapping between two
abstract concepts.
Can Multiple Mental Metaphors Be
Processed at the Same Time and, If This Is
the Case, What Are the Underlying
Mechanisms Allowing This Simultaneous
Activation?
With regard to the second goal of the present study, the
present data suggest that two mental metaphors can be processed
at the same time, as in Vicario et al’s (2008) study. In
Experiment 1, a left-past/right-future and a past-negative/future-
positive congruency effects were observed in the temporal
judgment task. In Experiment 2, accuracy analyses revealed that
the left-past/right-future, left-negative/right-positive and past-
negative/future-positive congruency effects were all activated in
both the temporal and valence judgment task. Interestingly, the
design of the analyses used in this study allowed us to observe
that the activations of these mental metaphors were independent
from each other. Indeed, the three-way interaction between the
factors of Time, Valence, and Response side was not significant.
Consequently, this means that the distinct congruency effects
observed here did not depend on the simultaneous use of
shared resources. If the mental metaphors were formed in
working memory during the execution of the task (Santiago
et al., 2011), each pole of each concept would have been
activated in working memory and the information of each
pole would have been used to simultaneously form more than
one mental metaphor. This competition for the simultaneous
use of information corresponding to each conceptual pole
would have resulted in a modulation of each of the other
mental metaphor processes. The same would have occurred if
the mental metaphors were due to the use of shared neural
substrates (Walsh, 2003). The multiple mental metaphors would
have competed for the use of the shared neural substrates,
resulting in a modulation of each of the other mental metaphor
processes.
This finding is rather surprising and appears to be more
compatible with the Conceptual Metaphor Theory view (Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Boroditsky, 2000). However, recent
findings strongly suggest that the mental metaphors are
processed online, in working memory (see Santiago et al., 2011,
for a review). We speculate that when participants form and use
mental metaphors, they first keep active in working memory all
the poles of each conceptual dimension in order to form themore
coherent representations for the task. Then, when these coherent
representations are formed, they are processed as a whole in
workingmemory, without the need to keep active their respective
poles. Processing the mental metaphors as a whole would reduce
cognitive load and would also be in line with attentional models
such as that of Corbetta and Shulman (2002). Corbetta and
Shulman (2002) hypothesized that the attentional sets that are
formed while performing an attentional task are maintained in
workingmemory during the carrying out of that task. Attentional
sets and mental metaphors have much in common in that, in
both cases, the relevant information for the task is selected and
organized to form a coherent representation for carrying out the
task. These representations, when kept active as a whole, would
produce congruency effects such as those observed here. A side
effect would be that processing one mental metaphor would not
modulate the processing of another mental metaphor because
the mapping information would be available in advance and not
formed online. More research aimed at testing the time course
of the type of information available in working memory while
processing mental metaphors is needed to test this hypothesis.
Is the Focus of Attention Important for
Activating a Mental Metaphor?
Regarding the third question about the importance of the
orientation of attention to activate a mental metaphor, it was
possible to observe that the activation of the mental metaphors
was task dependent; the left-negative/right-positive congruency
effect was greater in the valence than in temporal judgment
task, the left-past/right-future congruency effect was greater in
the temporal than in valence judgment task, and a significant
past-negative/future-positive congruency effect was observed in
the temporal judgment task in Experiments 1 and 2, and in
the valence judgment task in Experiment 2. The fact that the
left-past/right-future and left-negative/right-positive congruency
effects were manifest mainly in the temporal and valence
judgment tasks, respectively, is an indication that attentional
cueing plays a key role in the activation of the mental metaphors.
In this case, participants were given cues by the type of judgment
(on valence or time) and the type of response (manual responses
with the left or right hand). This finding is congruent with
those of de la Vega et al. (2012), Santiago et al. (2012) and
Torralbo et al. (2006), who showed that the type of judgment
and response could serve as cues for the activation of particular
mental metaphors. Interestingly, given that in the opposite task
some of the congruency effects could be observed, albeit to a
lesser extent, it appears that the effects of attentional orienting
on the activation of metaphors is a gradual process. Thus the
more attention allocated to the concepts of a mental metaphor,
the stronger the activation of this metaphor would be.
Surprisingly, the past-negative/future-positive congruency
effect was significant only in the temporal judgment task in
Experiment 1 and greater in the valence judgment task in
Experiment 2. Here it is important to note that the instructions
before starting an experimental block were exactly the same in
both experiments and that the irrelevant conceptual dimension
(time and valence in the valence and temporal judgment
tasks, respectively) was equally cued by the instructions in
both judgment tasks (in the temporal task instructions, the
words “positive” and “negative” of the valence judgment task
were simply interchanged with the words “future” and “past,”
respectively). We can think of two possible reasons, one linked
to the relative salience of the concepts of time and valence, and
the other linked to the activation of different mental metaphors.
According to the relative salience hypothesis, the past-
negative/future-positive congruency effect would have been
manifest only in the temporal judgment task in Experiment
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FIGURE 7 | Distribution of RT (in ms) data per condition in Experiment 2, as a function of Type of judgment, Time, and Response side. ***p < 0.001.
1 because the conceptual dimension of valence is intrinsically
more salient than that of time. Some studies suggest that the
dimension of valence is effectively more salient than other more
neutral dimensions due to connections with emotional neural
structures (e.g., Kuchinke et al., 2005; Nakic et al., 2006). As
a consequence, the participants would process the concept of
valence more deeply in the temporal judgment task than the
concept of time in the valence judgment task. One could argue
that, if the dimension of valence was so active in the temporal
task in Experiment 1, a left-negative/right-positive congruency
effect should also have been observed in the temporal judgment
task, which was not the case. Nevertheless, Santiago et al. (2011)
argued that mental metaphors are activated in order to create a
coherent and efficient representation of the borrowing concept
in relation to the task that has to be carried out with that concept.
Since the spatial representation of valence is completely unrelated
to the temporal judgment task, this mental metaphor would be
of no use and not activated in this task. In Experiment 2, the
strong temporal component of the mindfulness induction, by
asking the participant to focus on the present moment while
performing relaxation exercises (see Appendix II) might have
driven participants’ attention to the temporal dimension, making
it more salient. As a result, the concept of time in the valence
judgment task would be processed with sufficient depth to
modulate the processing of the valence concept.
Another possibility is that the participants of Experiment 1
might have activated a mental metaphor in which the temporal
dimension is valued, but not the opposite. Because people
frequently value the past and the future but do not temporalize
the valence dimension in their daily life, they would come
to store this mental metaphor in long term memory along
within the structure of time. As a consequence, this would
be readily activated when processing the concept of time, but
not that of valence (for a similar view, see Casasanto, 2008).
As for Experiment 2, the strong temporal component of the
mindfulness induction used in a therapy context might have
contributed to the temporalization of the dimension of valence,
which also led to a past-negative/future-positive congruency
effect in the valence task.
The present results do not allow us to distinguish between
these two possibilities and these explanations cannot account for
the fact that, when Mindfulness was included as a fixed factor in
a further analysis, it did not modulate the activation of Time is
Valence metaphor in any of the experimental conditions. Further
research is needed to directly address this issue. Nevertheless,
it is important to note that, no matter what the explanation,
these discrepancies between tasks and Experiments highlight
the flexibility in the activation of the mental metaphors and
this flexibility is predicted by the Coherent Working Models
(Santiago et al., 2011).
CONCLUSION
The present results allowed us to reveal that it is possible to create
a mental metaphor between two abstract concepts, and that the
focus of attention is important for activating a specific mental
metaphor. Accordingly, the activation of the mental metaphor
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between the two abstract concepts (time and valence) appeared
to depend on attentional factors. These findings are in line with
the Coherent Working Models theory (Santiago et al., 2011),
but other results are puzzling. In particular, within the state-of-
the-art models already published in the scientific literature, it is
difficult to explain the independent simultaneous activations of
different mental metaphors together with the need for attention
to activate a mental metaphor. Here we proposed an adjustment
of the Coherent Working Models theory (Santiago et al., 2011),
but more research to directly address this issue will be needed
before we endorse this possibility. Moreover, we have yet to
determine the precise factors explaining why the congruency
effect between the dimensions of valence and time was significant
only in the temporal judgment task in Experiment 1 whereas it
was greater in the valence judgment task in Experiment 2, with
a mindfulness induction. It is also unclear why, under certain
circumstances, some congruency effects were observed in the
accuracy results, but not in the reaction time data (e.g., most
of the congruency effects observed in Experiment 1 were only
evident in the accuracy data). Future research will therefore be
necessary to shed light on the characteristics of the mechanisms
responsible for these effects.
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